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ABSTRACT
The Recording Industry Association of America ("RIAA") has sued over 35,000 people
for illegal file-sharing music, or uploading and downloading music. The RIAA has
sued anyone under its "making available" theory, or anyone who offers to distribute
copyrighted music without the owner's consent. However, the United States Circuit
Courts of Appeals are split on whether copyright infringement occurs when a file is
"made available" or when there is actual dissemination of a file. Due to this split, the
RIAA has negotiated deals with internet service providers to penalize individuals
who illegally share files. This article analyzes a recent decision, Capitol Records v.
Thomas, and argues why the RIAA could not enforce its rights under a deal with
ISPs. Furthermore, this article argues that the RIAA should continue to sue for
direct infringement and contributory infringement. Finally, this article proposes a
modification to section 101 of the Copyright Act.
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MONEY FOR NOTHING AND MUSIC FOR FREE? WHY THE RIAA SHOULD
CONTINUE TO SUE ILLEGAL FILE-SHARERS
WILLIAM HENSLEE*

INTRODUCTION

The Recording Industry Association of America ("RIAA")' has sued over 35,000
people in the past five years attempting to prevent the illegal file-sharing (uploading
and downloading) of music. 2 The RIAA's theory of liability relied on the concept that
3
the unauthorized act of uploading a digital music file is copyright infringement.
Simply posting a digital file without the permission of the copyright owner on a
shared folder was enough for a lawsuit from the RIAA. 4 These suits alleged a
violation of the copyright owner's exclusive right "to distribute copies or phonorecords

*Associate Professor of Law, and founding faculty member, Florida A & M University College
of Law. B.A. University of Hawaii, J.D. Pepperdine University School of Law, M.F.A. University of
California, Los Angeles Graduate School of Theater, Film, & Television. Special thanks to Elizabeth
Kirk, J.D., for her excellent work on this project. Thank you to my program assistant, Sharon
Jenrette, for all her help.
1 1 ROBERT LIND ET AL., ENTERTAINMENT LAW 3D: LEGAL CONCEPTS AND BUSINESS PRACTICES
§ 1.142 (2008) (stating that the RIAA represents the interests of the recording industry); Frank
Ahrens, Music Industry Sues Online Song Swappers Trade Group Says First Batch of Lawsuits
Targets 261 Major Offenders, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 2003, at A01 (noting that the RIAA represents
the music industry's five largest music companies of Universal Music, Sony Music Entertainment,
Warner Music Group, BMG Entertainment and EMI); RIAA - Who We Are, http://www.riaa.com/
aboutus.php (last visited Sept. 1, 2009) (stating the RIAA's mission, purpose, and typical activities).
2 RIAA to Stop Mass Lawsuits, ROLLING STONE, Feb. 5, 2009, at 18; see Antony Bruno, A New
Battle Plan: FreshApproach Needed in RIAA's FightAgainst Piracy,BILLBOARD, Oct. 18, 2008, at
16 ("From the very minute it issued the first 261 lawsuits on Sept. 8, 2003, the RIAA's strategy to
target P2P users rather than just the P2P networks themselves was a contentious one .... The sole
point of the lawsuit effort is to reinforce the message that P2P file sharing is illegal.").
After suing 35,000 people since September 2003 for illegally sharing music files
online, the Recording Industry Association of America announced in December
that it has halted its controversial lawsuit campaign. 'It isn't working for them,'
says a major-label source. 'Massive piracy hasn't decreased.' The RIAA will
immediately change its strategy: It plans to team up with Internet service
providers to identify copyright infringers, send warning letters and, in extreme
cases, shut off service.
RIAA to Stop Mass Lawsuits, supra.
3 See, e.g., Complaint at 3-4, Virgin Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Minn.
2008) (Civ. No. 06-1497) (sub nom. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas); see also Steve Knopper, RL4A
Will Keep On Suing: The Music Industry has Targeted 11,456 Illegal Downloaders - Has it Done
Any Good., ROLLING STONE, June 9, 2005, http://www.rolllingstone.com/news/story/7380412/riaawilltkeep_on~suing (discussing how the RIAA is suing people for illegally downloading and sharing
copyrighted music).
4 See Press Release, Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Statement of Mitch Bainwol (Sept. 30,
2003) (on file with The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law), available at
http://www.riaa.com/newsitem.php?id=6BB95D3D-27FC-BD92-B338-D80172A90DD 1.
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of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by
5
rental, lease, or lending."
To establish a prima facie case for infringement, the plaintiff must prove, first,
ownership of a valid copyright, and second, that the defendant violated one or more
of the plaintiffs exclusive rights under 17 U.S.C. § 106.6 The difficulty with the
RIAA's position was that it required the Copyright Act to be read to include an offer
to distribute as an act of distribution and publication. 7 While the RIAA's position is
logical and defensible, at least one court has disagreed with their premise and
required proof of actual transfer.8 Since the emergence of the RIAA's theory there
has been a split in the circuits. There is one school of thought that believes it is
sufficient for the RIAA to prove infringement by the act of uploading to a shared
folder.9 The act of uploading was proof of infringement and sufficient evidence of the
detriment, because the shared folder allowed anyone who accessed the folder to
download the copyrighted file. 10 Stated simply, "proof of transfer" was unnecessary,
the only requirement was proof of uploading. 11 The other perspective requires a
5 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2006); see, e.g., Interscope Records v. Does 1-7, 494 F. Supp. 2d 388, 389
(E.D. Va. 2007).
6 17 U.S.C. § 501; Feist Pubrns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991)
(indicating that plaintiffs must demonstrate ownership of a valid copyright and copying of the
original work).
Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner as
provided by sections 106 through 122 or of the author as provided in section
106A(a), or who imports copies or phonorecords into the United States in violation
of section 602, is an infringer of the copyright or right of the author, as the case
may be. For purposes of this chapter (other than section 506), any reference to
copyright shall be deemed to include the rights conferred by section 106A(a). As
used in this subsection, the term "anyone" includes any State, any
instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a State or
instrumentality of a State acting in his or her official capacity. Any State, and
any such instrumentality, officer, or employee, shall be subject to the provisions of
this title in the same manner and to the same extent as any nongovernmental
entity.
17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (emphasis added).
7 See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1215 (D. Minn. 2008).
Plaintiffs further argue that even if the law required a defendant's active
involvement in making distributions, Thomas is liable because she took the active
steps of willfully reproducing copyrighted works without authorization and
affirmatively choosing to place them in a shared folder making them available to
anyone who wanted them on a computer network dedicated to the illegal
distribution of copyrighted works.
Id.
8 See Nat'l Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, 991 F.2d 426, 430 (8th Cir. 1993).
9 BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888, 889 (7th Cir. 2005) ("[P]eople who post or download
music files are primary infringers.") (emphasis added); Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints, 118 F.3d 199, 203 (4th Cir. 1997) ("When a public library adds a work to its collection,
lists the work in the index ...and makes the work available to the ... public," violation of the
exclusive right of distribution has occurred) (emphasis added); Artista Records L.L.C. v. Greubel,
453 F. Supp. 2d 961, 971-72 (N.D. Tex. 2006); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552,
1556-57 (M.D. Fla. 1993); Atl. Recording Corp. v. Anderson, Civ. No. H-06-3578, 2008 WL 2316551,
at *7 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 12, 2008).
10BMG Music, 430 F.3d at 889; see In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 645 (7th Cir.
2003); Hotaling,118 F.3d at 203.
11 See BMGMusic, 430 F.3d at 889. One commentator stated:
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proof of transfer, meaning one has to download the file from the shared folder for
2
infringement to occur.'
The RIAA's legal strategy has changed since Jammie Thomas convinced a
Minnesota District Court Judge to reverse himself in Ms. Thomas' trial for copyright
infringement.' 3 Ms. Thomas was originally assessed a fine of $222,000 for sharing
songs on Kazaa. 14 After considering the case, Chief Judge Michael J. Davis, reversed
himself on September 24, 2008.15 Following that setback, the RIAA announced on
December 19, 2008, a "new plan" to replace the litigation strategy based on the old
theory, that an offer to distribute satisfies 17 U.S.C. § 106(3), and abandon the
pursuit of infringers through the legal process that has cost so much time, effort, and
negative public relations. 16 The strategy replacing the RIAA's "no proof of transfer
required" theory is one that involves a deal with several internet service providers to
restrict, and even remove, internet access for users who continue to illegally upload
7
music for unauthorized distribution.'
While the new strategy remains untested, unproven, and criticized by every
18
foreign government in which it has been used, Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas,
continues to serve as an example of how well litigation works to spread the word that
downloading is illegal. 19 On June 18, 2009, after a four day trial, a new jury came

Is the existence of an open share folder, screen shots of music listed and
downloads taken, and IP addresses enough "proof'? Or does the RIAA need to
show that a particular copyrighted song was sent from one computer to another?
The answer will help determine the validity of the RIAA's controversial
claim that merely "making available" copyright music is a sufficient basis for
committing infringement. That claim has been the underpinning behind many of
the 20,000 lawsuits the industry association has pursued against individual
pirates.
If the judge reverses his prior position and orders a new trial in the Thomas
case, the music industry may see accused pirates put up more vigorous defenses.
Eriq Gardner, LegalRoundup: Proofof Transfer,BILLBOARD, Sept. 6, 2008, at 10.
12 Nat] Car Rental, 991 F.2d at 434 ("[I]nfringement of [the distribution right] requires an
actual dissemination of either copies or phonorecords." (quoting 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.11[A] (1998))); AtJ. Recording, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 985 ("It is
untenable that the definition of a different word in a different section of the statute was meant to
expand the meaning of 'distribution' and liability under § 106(3) to include offers to distribute.");
London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 169 (D. Mass. 2008).
13 Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1226-27 (D. Minn. 2008) (reversing
the jury verdict because Jury Instruction No. 15 was erroneous and prejudicial to Thomas' rights,
vacating the judgment, and granting Thomas a new trial); see also Bruno, supra note 2 ("Jammie
Thomas, a Minnesota single mom who took the RIAA to court and initially lost a $222,000 verdict,
recently won a retrial based on an appeal that making available music in a shared folder is not the
same as infringement .... ).
14 Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1227.
15 Id. at 1220, 1226-27 ("The Court concludes that simply because all distributions within the
meaning of § 106(3) are publications does not mean that all publications within the meaning of § 101
are distributions.").
16See RILA to Stop Mass Lawsuits, supra note 2.
17 Id.

579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Minn. 2008).
19See, e.g., Marc E. Mayer, Distributive Principles:
18

The Determination of Copyright

Infringement May Hinge on Whether 'Actual Distribution" or Mere 'Making Available" Has
Occurred,32 L.A. LAWYER 35, 40 (2009).
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back with a verdict of $1.92 million against Ms. Thomas-Rasset.2 0 This verdict will
most likely be appealed. 2 1 The size of the RIAA win could cause public backlash.22
This article will discuss why the RIAA should continue to sue alleged illegal filesharers, and evaluate the RIAA's "new" theory. In addition, this article will conclude
with a proposed amendment to the Copyright Act to include an offer to distribute in
the definition of distribution and to allow for publication and dissemination to be
synonymous in a peer-to-peer file-sharing context. 23

I. THE WHEELS ON THE

Bus Go 'ROUND

AND 'ROUND

On April 19, 2006, Capitol Records filed a complaint against Jammie Thomas
alleging that she infringed their 17 U.S.C. § 106 exclusive rights in twenty-four
sound recordings.2 4 The trial began on October 2, 2007, and at closing, the jury was
given instructions including one that stated: "The act of making copyrighted sound
recordings available for electronic distribution on a peer-to-peer network, without
license from the copyright owners, violates the copyright owners' exclusive right of
distribution, regardless of whether actual distribution has been shown." 25 On the
basis of this instruction, on October 4, 2007, the jury returned a verdict with a
finding that Thomas had willfully infringed by uploading copyrighted songs on the
Internet, and awarded Capitol Records $9,250 for each willful infringement. 26 On
20 Special Verdict Form at 17-20, Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, No. 06-CV- 1497 (MJD/RLE)
(D. Minn. June 18, 2009), 2009 WL 2030495 [hereinafter 2009 Special Verdict Form]. Instead of
damages of $9,250 per song awarded by the first jury, the second jury awarded damages of $80,000
per song. Compare Special Verdict Form at 2, 4-8, No. 06-CV-1497 (MJD/RLE) (D. Minn. Oct. 4,
2007), 2007 WL 2957532 [hereinafter 2007 Special Verdict Form] (awarding $9,250 in statutory
damages for each copyrighted work infringed), with 2009 Special Verdict form, supra (awarding
$80,000 in statutory damages for each copyrighted work infringed). The damage award increased
from $222,000 in the first trial to $1,920,000 in the second trial. Compare 2007 Special Verdict
Form, supra (awarding $220,000 in damages), with 2009 Special Verdict form, supra (awarding
$1,920,000 in damages).
21 Alex

Ebert & Curt Brown, Two Losses and $1.9M in the Hole, Still De'fiant: Slammed by a

Jury, Jammie Thomas-Rasset Maintains Her Innocence, But She Admits the Evidence is Stacked
Against Her, STAR TRIBUNE, June 20, 2009, at Bi, available at http://www.startribune.comlocal/
48641077.html?elr=KArksUUoDEy3LGDiO7aiU.
22
Ben Sheffner, The Law Won: Majors Welcome P2P Win, But $1.92MA ward Could Make For
Bad PR, BILLBOARD, June 27, 2009, at 10 ("While the recording industry maintains strong support
in Congress, with powerful champions including House Judiciary Committee Chairman John
Conyers, D-Mich., and his Senate counterpart Patrick Leahy, D-Vt., the Minneapolis verdict could
well lead to a legislative move to reduce the damages awards available against individual infringers
like Thomas-Rasset.").
23 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1158-60 (9th Cir.
2004) (noting that peer-to-peer networks do not store information on a central server, but on the
computers of individual users). Because of how this network is arranged, a user must have a
software program like Grokster to access the network. See id. at 1158-60. The index of files on the
network is limited to just the material hosted on the computer of the users who are online and
logged into the network through the software program. See id. at 1158.
24 Complaint, Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Minn. 2008) (No. 06CV- 1497 (MJD/RLE)).
25 Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1213.
26

Id.
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October 15, 2007, Defendant filed a Motion for a New Trial. 27 "On May 15, 2008, the
Court issued an Order stating that it was contemplating granting a new trial" on the
28
basis of the disputed jury instruction.
Ms. Thomas argued that the jury instruction did not require proof of actual
distribution in order to prove a violation of 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) and that a proof of
transfer would be necessary. 29 Capitol Records argued that proof of transfer did not
matter because Thomas violated the section 106() reproduction right. 30 The parties
agreed that the only evidence of actual dissemination was the downloading of the
songs by MediaSentry, Capitol Records agent. 31 Capitol Records argued that the
active steps of willfully reproducing copyrighted works without authorization, and
uploading the works in a shared folder, making them available to anyone who
wanted them, was enough for a finding of liability. 32 Ms. Thomas retorted that
MediaSentry completed the actual downloading of the copies of the work; she did not
participate in any distribution. 33
The court looked to the statutory framework, specifically 17 U.S.C. § 106(3),
which states, "[T]he owner of a copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to
do and to authorize any of the following: ... (3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of
the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by
rental, lease, or lending." 34 The court also noted that "[c]ourts have split regarding
whether making copyrighted materials available for distribution constitutes
distribution under section 106(3)." 3 5 The court addressed this issue in four main
parts: "1) whether the plain meaning of the term ... requires ... dissemination of
the copyrighted work [for distribution]; 2) whether the term 'distribution' is
synonymous with. .. 'publication'. . . ; 3) whether a defendant [is] primarily liable
for authorizing dissemination; and 4) whether U.S. treaty obligations ... and
legislative ... interpretation
of ... those
obligations
require a particular
36
interpretation of. . . 'distribution."'

A. The First Wheel That Fell Off the Thomas Bus
In looking at the first question, the court found a plain reading of the statute
supported a finding that distribution only occurs when a defendant actually transfers
ownership or actual copies or phonorecords of a work. 37 The plain language of

27

Id.

28

Id.

Id. at 1214.
30 Id.
29

31

Id.

Id. at 1215.
33 Id. at 1214-15 ("It is well-established that the lawful owner of a copyright cannot infringe its
copyright." (quoting Olan Mills, Inc. v. Linn Photo Co., 23 F.3d 1345, 1348 (8th Cir. 1994)
32

own
(citation omitted))).

34 Id. at 1216 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2006)).
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 1216-17.
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section 106(3) describes distribution as the "sale, transfer of ownership, rental, lease,
38
or lending" and therefore an "offer" to do any of these things is not distribution.
If the court is correct in its interpretation of section 106(3), the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Metro-Goldwyn -Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster,39 was
wrongly decided. 40 Despite the Minnesota District Court's sympathy for a single
mother getting caught illegally uploading music on Kazaa, the Grokster decision,
discussed in more detail below, was correct in its determination that the act of
41
uploading, without proof of further dissemination, violates section 106.
In her second trial, "The RIAA anti-piracy contractor, MediaSentry, presented
evidence that Thomas-Rasset actually distributed [eleven] copyrighted songs through
Kazaa (to MediaSentry's investigators), and cited metadata from tracks in her shared
folder strongly suggesting that the files had themselves been downloaded, not
purchased or ripped from her CD collection." 42 While the RIAA's case was primarily
built on circumstantial evidence, it was enough to convince the jury to penalize her
for attempting to cover-up her unauthorized activities. 43

B. The Second Wheel That Fell Off the Thomas Bus
For the second question, the Thomas court looked to the section 101 definition of
44
publication, finding that distribution and publication were not synonymous.
Section 101 defines publication as:
[T]he distribution of copies or phonorecords of a work to the public by
sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending. The
offering to distribute copies or phonorecords to a group of persons for
purposes of further distribution, public performance, or public display,
constitutes publication. A public performance or display of a work does not
45
of itself constitute publication.
The court found that while the first sentences of the section 101 definition and
section 106(3) were "substantially identical," there was clarifying language in
section 101.46 In addition, the court found that nowhere in the legislative history of
section 106 did Congress state that distribution should be given the same broad

38

Id. at 1217.

39545 U.S. 913 (2005).
40 See id.at 936-37 (indicating that uploading files to a file-sharing network is copyright
infringement).
41
42

See id.

Jon Healey, RIAA:
2, Jammie Thomas-Rasset:
0, L.A. TIMEs, June 18, 2009,
http:/latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/2009/06/riaa-jammie-thomas-rasset-piracy-verdictkazaa.html ("RIAA witnesses also linked the Kazaa uploads to a unique identifier on ThomasRasset's modem and computer and showed that the unusual username on the Kazaa account
matched one that Thomas-Rasset acknowledged using on several other websites.").
43 Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1213, 1215-16.
44Id. at 1220.
4517 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
46 Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1219.
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meaning as publication. 47 The court found that publication and distribution were
distinct concepts. 48 "The statutory definition of publication [was] broader than the
term distribution as used in § 106(3)." 49 The court found that "[a] publication can
occur by means of the 'distribution of copies or phonorecords of a work to the public,"'
but "a publication may also [be an] 'offering to distribute copies or phonorecords to a
group of persons for purposes of further distribution, public performance, or public
display."' 50 With this fine line, the court found a publication occurs when one
distributes copies or phonorecords, but an offer to distribute copies or phonorecords is
a mere offer of distribution, not an actual distribution.5 1 The court decided that when
Congress' chose to use both terms within the Copyright Act, that choice showed
52
intent for the terms to have different meanings.
While the court was correct in determining that publication and distribution
have different meanings, it was incorrect in determining that an offer to distribute
cannot satisfy the definition of distribution under section 106(3). 3 Failing to
recognize that uploading media to a file sharing network, without actual proof of
downloading (i.e., distribution), creates an impossible burden for plaintiffs in file
sharing cases. The court ignored Capitol Records argument that the act of uploading
copyrighted material without permission from the copyright owner violates 17 U.S.C.
§ 106(i), the right of reproduction.5 4 Had the court recognized the violation of the
55
right of reproduction, it would not have had to reach the issue of distribution.

47 Id.
48

Id. at 1220.

49Id.
50 Id. (quoting

17 U.S.C. § 101).

Id.
52 Id.
51

53

See Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1219.

54Id. at 1215.

Plaintiffs further argue that even if the law required a defendant's active

involvement in making distributions, Thomas is liable because she took the active
steps of willfully reproducing copyrighted works without authorization and

affirmatively choosing to place them in a shared folder making them available to
anyone who wanted them on a computer network dedicated to the illegal
distribution of copyrighted works.
Id.
55

See id.at 1220.
The Court concludes that simply because all distributions within the
meaning of § 106(3) are publications does not mean that all publications within
the meaning of § 101 are distributions. The statutory definition of publication is
broader than the term distribution as used in § 106(3). A publication can occur by
means of the "distribution of copies or phonorecords of a work to the public by sale
of other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease or lending." § 101. This portion
of the definition of publication defines a distribution as set forth in § 106(3).
However, a publication may also occur by "offering to distribute copies or

phonorecords to a group of persons for purposes of further distribution, public
performance,

or public display."

§ 101.

While

a publication effected by

distributing copies or phonorecords of the work is a distribution, a publication
effected by merely offering to distribute copies or phonorecords to the public is
merely an offer of distribution, not an actual distribution.
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Unfortunately for the court, yet fortunately for this article, the court focused its
infringement analysis on section 106(3).56
While the Copyright Act does not directly define distribution, the United States
Supreme Court has equated it with "publication."5 7 Further, Congress described
distribution when revising the Copyright Act in 1976:
Public distribution.-Clause (3) of section 106 establishes the exclusive
right of publication: The right 'to distribute copies or phonorecords of the
copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by
rental, lease, or lending.' Under this provision the copyright owner would
have the right to control the first public distribution of an authorized copy
or phonorecord of his work, whether by sale, gift, loan, or some rental or
lease arrangement. Likewise, any unauthorized pubic distribution of
copies or phonorecords that were unlawfully made would be an
58
infringement.
Additionally, "[u]nder the definition in section 101, a work is 'published' if one or
more copies or phonorecords... are distributed to the public ...without regard to
the manner in which the copies or phonorecords changed hands."5 9 With this in
mind, publication only requires an infringer to offer to distribute a copyrighted work
for the purpose of further distribution, meaning to provide additional copies to third
parties. 60 If publication is "[t]he offering to distribute copies or phonorecords to a
group of persons for the purposes of further distribution, public performance, or
public display,"6 1 then actual dissemination of the work is not necessary for a
violation of the copyright owners' exclusive right of publication. It follows that actual
62
dissemination should not be required to prove a violation of the distribution right.
Without any proof of third party downloading or review of any kind, the United
States Supreme Court has held that uploading a newspaper article for electronic
transmission without the permission of the copyright owner is copyright
63
infringement.

56

Id.

57Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 552 (1985).
58 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 62 (1976) (emphasis added).
59Id. at 138.
60 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) ("The offering to distribute copies or phonorecords to a group of
persons for the purposes of further distribution ...constitutes publication.").
61 See id. §§ 101, 106(3); Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 118 F.3d 199,
203 (4th Cir. 1997).
62 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106(3); Hotaling, 118 F.3d at 203.
63 See New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 498 (2001) (holding that LEXIS/NEXIS
exercised the exclusive right of distribution, 17 U.S.C. § 106(3), by selling copies of copyrighted

articles through its NEXIS database); see also Agee v. Paramount Commc'ns, Inc., 59 F.3d 317, 32526 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Playboy Enters., Inc., v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993)) (stating

that an offer to distribute files can be an "unauthorized uploading of copyrighted images onto [a]
computer bulletin board with knowledge that images would be downloaded by other bulletin board
subscribers.").
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C. The Third Wheel That Fell Off the Thomas Bus
For the third question, the Thomas court found that the authorization clause in
section 106(3), which states "[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the
exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following ... (3) to distribute,"
merely provided a "statutory foundation for secondary liability, [and was] not a
means of expanding the scope of direct infringement liability."6 4 The court found the
"authorization" clause was intended to avoid any question of liability for contributory
infringers, not to be an assessment of direct liability.65 The court stated, "Equating
making available with distribution would undermine settled case law holding that
merely inducing or encouraging another to infringe does not, alone, constitute
66
infringement unless the encouraged party actually infringes."
The court's argument is flawed. In the case of file sharing, the uploader is
encouraging others to download songs from the shared files, however, the uploader
likely does not know who the others in the file sharing network are and whether the
files uploaded are of actual interest to any potential downloaders.6 7 The fact that the
uploader does not personally encourage specific individuals to download should not
shield the uploader from liability.6 8 Making a file available on a file sharing network,
without the permission of the copyright owner, should be sufficient to violate the
language of section 106.69
Liability for copyright infringement does not require a proof of taking, but it
does require (1) adding a work to a collection; (2) listing a work in an index; and (3)
making the work available to the public. 70 Posting a song on a P2P server is adding a
work to a collection, listing the work in an index, and making the work available to
the public; it satisfies all of the elements discussed in Hotaling v. Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints. 71 Further, the United States Supreme Court has held
that a copyright owners' distribution right is violated when a copy is made without
72
the owners' consent.
The issue with proving electronic transfer of materials on a P2P network is that
the system is designed to "willfully blind" the distributor of the software, and thus no
one maintains a record of transfer.7 3 However, copyright infringement is a strict
64 Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1220-21 (D. Minn. 2008).
65 Id. at 1221 (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 61 (1976)).
66 Id. (citing Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936-37

(2005)).
See id.
Grokster,545 U.S. at 919.
Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 118 F.3d 199, 203 (4th Cir.
1997); Atl. Recording Corp. v. Anderson, Civ. No. H-06-3578, 2008 WL 2316551, at *8 (S.D. Tex.
67

68 See
69 See

Mar. 12, 2008).
70 Hotaling, 118 F.3d at 203 (concluding that a violation of the exclusive right of distribution
has occurred); see BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888, 889 (7th Cir. 2005) ("[P]eople who post or

download music are primary infringers" (emphasis added)).
71 Hotaling, 118 F.3d at 203 (finding that adding unauthorized copies of protected works in a

library collection is an infringement of the distribution right).
72 See Grokster,545 U.S. at 928-30 (recognizing primary liability of posting users who created
unauthorized copies of music files in a case for contributory liability); see also A&M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a copyright holder's distribution
rights are violated by Napster users who upload files).
73 In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003).
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liability offense, and intent is only relevant when determining damages. 74 According
to several district courts, making copyrighted works available to others may
75
constitute infringement by distribution in certain circumstances.
In effect, the motivation for downloading this type of software is to infringe, and
receive "free" music, movies, or files.7 6 While it is reasonable to assume a certain
portion of these files belong to the public domain or are non-infringing, it is also
reasonable to assume that the majority of files that are actually downloaded are
infringing. 77 Uploading a copyrighted file to a file sharing site without permission of
the copyright owner should be enough for copyright infringement regardless of intent
78
or knowledge of potential downloaders.

D. The Fourth Wheel That Fell Off the Thomas Bus
The fourth question involved the application of international law.7 9 The United
States has adopted and ratified two treaties, the World Intellectual Property
Organization Copyright Treaty ("WCT") and the World Intellectual Property
Organization Performances and Phonograms Treaty ("WPPT).80 The Thomas court
stated, "It is undisputed that the WCT and the WPPT recognize a making-available
right that is not dependent on proof that copies were actually transferred to

Willful blindness is knowledge, in copyright law.., as it is the law generally.
(citation omitted) One who, knowingly or strongly suspecting that he is involved
in shady dealings, takes steps to make sure that he does not acquire full or exact
knowledge of the nature and extent of those dealings is held to have a criminal
intent, (citation omitted), because a deliberate effort to avoid guilty knowledge is
all that the law requires to establish a guilty state of mind.
Id.
74

See Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 204 F.3d 601, 607 (5th Cir. 2000).

75 See Artista Records, L.L.C. v. Greubel, 453 F. Supp. 2d 961, 971-72 (N.D. Tex. 2006); Atl.

Recording Corp. v. Anderson, Civ. No. H-06-3578, 2008 WL 2316551, at *8 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 12, 2008);
Warner Bros. Records, Inc. v. Payne, Civ. No. W-06-CA-051, 2006 WL 2844415, at *4 (W.D. Tex.
July 17, 2006).
76 See Grokster,545 U.S. at 937-38.
The only apparent question about treating MGM's evidence as sufficient to
withstand summary judgment under the theory of inducement goes to the need on
MGM's part to adduce evidence that StreamCast and Grokster communicated an
inducing message to their software users. The classic instance of inducement is
by advertisement or solicitation that broadcasts a message designed to stimulate
others to commit violations .... Grokster distributed an electronic newsletter
containing links to articles promoting its software's ability to access popular
copyrighted music.
Id.
77 See id. at 952 (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating that MGM's expert "declared that 75% of
current files available on Grokster are infringing and 15% are 'likely infringing."').
78 See Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 118 F.3d 199, 203 (4th Cir.
1997); At. Recording Corp., 2008 WL 2316551, at *8.
79 Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1225 (D. Minn. 2008).
80 WIPO Copyright Treaty, Contracting Parties (1996), available at http://www.wipo.int/export/
sites/www/treaties/en/documents/pdf/wct.pdf;
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty,
Contracting
Parties
(2008),
available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/treaties/en
documents/pdf/wppt.pdf.
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particular individuals." 81 The court also noted, by ratifying and adopting these
treaties, the Executive and Legislative branches of government indicated that U.S.
law complied with the treaties and the making-available clause.8 2 The court,
however, relied on the fact that the treaties are not self-executing and "lack any
binding legal authority separate from their implementation through the Copyright
84
Act."8 3 As a result, the court found the treaties non-persuasive.
However, the fact that both the Executive and Legislative branches reviewed the
language of the Copyright Act and determined that the statutory language was
adequate to grant copyright holders the right to sue for infringement when an
unauthorized third party makes a protected work available should have been
sufficient for the court to recognize that an offer to distribute violates
section 106(3).85
When the first three questions are read in conjunction with the WIPO treaties, it
shows that the United States would not be in compliance with international
agreements if read to construe publication as more than an offer in an electronic
file-sharing context. On December 20, 1996 the United States entered into the World
Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") Copyright Treaty.8 6 Article 6 of the
Treaty states, "Authors of literary and artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right of
authorizing the making available to the public of the original and copies of their
works through sale or other transfer of ownership."8 7 In implementing the treaty,
Congress heard from Marybeth Peters, the Register of Copyrights, who stated, "After
an extensive analysis the Copyright Office concluded that existing protections are
adequate to fulfill all but two of the substantive treaty obligations."8 8 This is
underscored by another statement by Marybeth Peters, "Making [a work] available
for other users of [a] peer to peer network to download .... constitutes an
infringement of the exclusive distribution right, as well as the reproduction right..
.,,89 As a result of ratification of the treaty by the executive and legislative branches,
combined with the finding of the Register of Copyrights, section 106(3) should be
read to create a making available right with no proof of transfer.
Because of the Thomas case, and others that follow its reasoning, the RIAA has
changed its legal strategy and is now relying on agreements with internet service
-

81 Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1225.

Id.
Id. at 1226.
84 Id.
82

83

85 See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1976)) (general revision to title 17 of the United States Code).
86 WIPO Copyright Treaty, Contracting Parties, supra note 80.
87 WIPO Copyright Treaty art. 6, adoptedDec.20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 69 (emphasis added).
88 WIPO Copyright TreatiesImplementation Act and Online Copyright LiabilityLimitation Act
Hearingon HR. 2281 and HR. 2280 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Propertyof
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 43 (1997) (statement of Marybeth Peters, Reg. of
Copyrights).
89 Letter from Marybeth Peters, Reg. of Copyrights, to Rep. Howard L. Berman, Rep. 28th Dist.

of Cal. (Sept. 25, 2002), reprinted in Piracy of Intellectual Property on Peer-to-PeerNetworks,
HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet,and IntellectualPropertyof the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary,107th Cong. 114-15 (2002).
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providers. 90 The details of these "secret" deals are not yet known. 91 While the "no
proof of transfer" doctrine was controversial, it was a logical interpretation of the
spirit of the law and necessary to stop illegal downloading. 92 A modification to the
section 101 definitions is all that is required to codify the theory. 93 In addition, the
United States Supreme Court has already adopted the proposition that offering a
music composition and sound recording for potential downloading by uploading it on
a file sharing network is infringement in the Grokster case, discussed below. 94 The
theory on which the RIAA now relies has serious Constitutional and public policy
ramifications independent of the Copyright Act.

II. DROP IT LIKE IT'S HOT: BACK-ROOM DEALS MAKE GOOD MOVIES, NOT GOOD LEGAL
THEORIES

The RIAA recently announced a new method for ending illegal downloading of
9
music, one that relies on the cooperation of internet-service providers ("ISP"). 5
While the details of the plan have not been released, the first step of the plan
requires the RIAA to notify the ISP's of suspected illegal downloading. 96 After
notification from the RIAA, the ISP will then notify the user of the alleged violation
and ask them to stop. 97 If the user continues to upload music for file-sharing, one or
two more additional notices will be delivered.98 If the user fails to remove the music
from the file-sharing domain, the ISP will cut-off the user's internet access all
together. 99
There are a couple of problems with this "solution." First, the design of the P2P
systems make it impossible to track or define individual users, only the username of
the network; second, there is no check or outside system to monitor the RIAA, the
terms of their contracts with the ISPs, or how the new "solution" is applied.

90 Sarah McBride & Ethan Smith, Music Industry to Abandon Mass Suits, WALL ST. J., Dec.
19, 2008, at B1.
91 Id.
92 BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888, 889 (7th Cir. 2005) ("[Pleople who post or download
music are primary infringers") (emphasis added); Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints, 118 F.3d 199, 203 (4th Cir. 1997) ("When a public library adds a work to its collection, lists
the work in the index.., and makes the work available to the ... public," violation of the exclusive
right of distribution has occurred) (emphasis added); Artista Records L.L.C. v. Greubel, 453 F. Supp.
2d 961, 971-72 (N.D. Tex. 2006); Ati. Recording Corp. v. Anderson, Civ. No. H-06-3578, 2008 WL
2316551, at *7-8 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 12, 2008); see Agee v. Paramount Commc'ns, Inc., 59 F.3d 317,
325-26 (2d Cir. 1995); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1556-57 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
93 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
94 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 928-30 (2005).
95
Antony Bruno, A New Game Plan: The Biz Faces Challenges As It Enlists ISPs To Help
Fight Piracy,BILLBOARD, Jan. 10, 2009, at 8 ("Enlisting the ISPs as allies, however, hasn't been an
easy task. Indeed, while the RIAA claims it has secured the cooperation of leadings ISPs in its

graduated-response efforts, Marks [RIAA general counsel] won't disclose which are onboard.");
McBride & Smith, supra note 90.
96 McBride & Smith, supranote 90.
97

Id.

98 Id.

99 Id.
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A. See Me, Fee]Me, Touch Me: The Design of the Peer-to-PeerSystem
A peer-to-peer (P2P) system works by allowing users to share electronic files
directly with each other rather than through a central server. 100 These networks
have achieved great popularity in recent years because there is no need for a central
computer to mediate the exchange of information once the file-sharing software has
been downloaded.10 1 This feature was designed to promote efficiency and to help the
10 2
software creators escape liability for third party infringements by software users.
Additionally, an uploaded file can be available for multiple users at any given time
making file requests and retrievals much faster for someone seeking to download a
file. 10 3 Because these requests do not occur through a central server, communications
can take place between any two computers that remain connected to the network. 104
The United States Supreme Court has already found that creators of this type of
software may be contributorily liable for copyright infringement, stating, "One
infringes contributorily by intentionally inducing or encouraging
direct
infringement."'1 5 There is no debate that when one has uploaded copyrighted
material without permission of the copyright owner on a P2P file-sharing network,
and a third party has downloaded that material, there is copyright infringement
06
because there was actual dissemination of the copyrighted material. 1
However, the P2P system is designed to mask the identity of the participants in
the transaction and does not indicate when a particular file is being downloaded or
who specifically is downloading the file. 10 7 For concrete proof, one would have to
photograph the screen during the process of downloading. 108 Even the ISP would not
have direct knowledge of the individual who downloaded the material from a
business or household account. 10 9 This could create problems for family households
who could potentially lose their Internet service because one member of the
household or family friend illegally downloads.

B. Do You Hear What I Hear? No Court System Means No DiscoveryProcess
Under the previous system where the RIAA sued the file-sharers in court, the
defendants had discovery rights to view the evidence against them and they could

100Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919-20 (2005).
101 Id.at 920.
102 See id. at 920,
103 Id. at 920.
104

934.

Id.

105 See

id. at 930 (citing Gershwin Pubrg Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159,
1162 (2d Cir. 1971)).
106 See generallyid. (holding that the Court could not find contributory infringement without a
finding of direct infringement).
107 Id. at 922-23.
108 See Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1216 (D. Minn. 2008). This is the
precise process that was debated during the Thomas case when MediaSentry used printouts of the
screen to show actual transfer. Id. This is also debated evidence because MediaSentry was the
agent of Capital Records, the owner of the copyright. Id. at 1214.
109 See Grokster,545 U.S. at 922-23.
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challenge the propriety of the evidence collection. 110 Under the RIAA's proposed
system, there does not appear to be any way for the accused file-sharer to view the
evidence and challenge the collection methods before they are forced to take down
their file-shared music or risk losing Internet service."' The courts afford those
accused of copyright infringement greater protection from zealous investigators. 112
In Massachusetts, 113 Arizona, 114 North Carolina, 115 and Maine, 116 the RIAA and
its investigative arm, MediaSentry, have come under scrutiny for unlicensed
investigations. 117 States' private investigator licensing systems are in place to
110See Arista Records L.L.C. v. Does 1-27, 584 F. Supp. 2d 240, 256 (D. Me. 2008); London
Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 176 n.30 (D. Mass. 2008); Capitol Records, Inc. v.
Weed, No. 2:06-CV-01124-PHX-JAT, 2008 WL 1820667, at *5 (D. Ariz. Apr. 22, 2008); Elektra
Entm't Group, Inc. v. Doe, No. 5:08-CV-115-FL, 2008 WL 5111885, at *6 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 26, 2008).
111See Bruno, supra note 95 (describing the RIAA's new tactics outside the court system and
therefore outside the normal evidentiary and procedural safeguards of the courts).
112 See Arista Records, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 256; London -Sire,542 F. Supp. 2d at 175-76; Weed,
2008 WL 1820667, at *5.
113 See London-Sire, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 176 n.30.
The same movant further contends that the Linares affidavit, which forms
the basis of some of the plaintiffs prima facie case, should be stricken. The
movant claims that MediaSentry, the private investigator who downloaded the
files from the Does and recorded their IP addresses (citation omitted) does not
have the license to undertake private investigations required by Massachusetts
General Laws ch. 147, §§ 23-25.
Id.
114 Weed, 2008 WL 1820667, at *5.
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs and MediaSentry agreed to violate Arizona
private investigator licensing requirements. (citation omitted) ...[Ain individual
or agency is required to be licensed before acting as a private investigator in the
state of Arizona. Defendant argues that since MediaSentry is not licensed in the
state of Arizona, Plaintiffs and MediaSentry's agreement to undergo an
investigation of Defendant's files is unlawful conduct.
Id.
115 See Elektra Entm't Group, 2008 WL 5111885, at *6 ("Plaintiffs move to strike the Linares
declaration, pursuant to Rule 12(f), on the grounds that Linares lacked the requisite personal
knowledge to make it and the unclean hands doctrine bars it because MediaSentry unlawfully
investigated defendant without a license.").
116See Arista Records, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 256.
Defendants claim that the Court never should have authorized the subpoena
because the facts Plaintiffs provided in support of their discovery motion were
gathered by allegedly criminal acts of MediaSentry, Plaintiffs' investigator.
Maine law prohibits persons from acting as private investigators without first
obtaining a license; acting as a private investigator without a license is a class D
crime.
Id.
117 Compare id. at 256-58 (rejecting allegations that MediaSentry's conduct was unlawful),
with Andy Greene, Battle Over Online PiracyGets a Sheriff London Company Web SheriffHelps
Top Artists-But Does it Go Too Far?, ROLLING STONE, Apr. 30, 2009, at 27 (discussing internet
trolling as a means to prevent online piracy).
Web Sheriff, which has a staff of 20 (mostly copyright attorneys and Internet
experts), performs a wide range of anti-piracy services for acts ....Monthly fees
begin at $1,000 and extend up to $25,000, depending on the package of services.
...Over the past several years, pre-release online piracy has become such a
problem that it was made a felony in the United States. When albums leak,
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protect the state citizens from unlicensed investigators who might use questionable
tactics. 118 Without the state courts' involvement, there is a danger that the evidence
will be accepted without being subject to cross-examination, which is unsettling
considering the previous 35,000 lawsuits the RIAA has filed since 2003.119
Thousands of people may be denied Internet access without the evidence against
them being scrutinized by a trier of fact.
In the past, the RIAA subpoenaed the ISP's for information identifying the users
of file-sharing software. 120 While this cooperative short-cut helped the RIAA by
quickly identifying infringers who had masked their identities with usernames
designed to hide their actual identities, the alleged infringers had the court system to
allow them to challenge the evidence against them. 121 Under the new system,
unlicensed investigators working for the RIAA will be evaluating the evidence
against the alleged infringers and the RIAA will act on that information without any
scrutiny of the evidence.
While the details of the agreements between the RIAA and the ISPs have not
been released, it is possible that every ISP will have slightly different terms in their
individual agreements. There is no difference in the legal theory under which the
RIAA will be operating. The act of posting a digital file on a shared folder will satisfy
the act of infringement. The RIAA's new method of punishing copyright infringers
relies on the same legal theory that some courts have rejected, placing the alleged
122
infringers at a distinct disadvantage.

artists lose everything from sales revenue to creative control over how much their
music is heard-early leaks aren't always mastered or sequenced the way the
final album will be.
... Most of the sites that host links to pre-release music-Bit-Torrent
aggregators, YouTube, peer-to-peer clients, MP3 blogs and download sites like
RapidShare and Megaupload-will remove the links if asked.
Andy Green, supra.
118See Arista Records, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 256; London-Sire, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 176 n.30; Weed,
2008 WL 1820667, at *5.
119See RIAA to Stop Mass Lawsuits, supra note 2.
120 McBride & Smith, supra note 90.
The new approach [of the RIAA] dispenses with one of the most contentious
parts of the lawsuit strategy, which involved filing lawsuits requiring ISPs to
disclose the identities of file sharers. Under the new strategy, the RIAA would
forward its emails to the ISPs without demanding to know the customers'
identity.
Id.
121 See Interscope Records v. Does 1-7, 494 F. Supp. 2d 388, 389-90 (E.D. Va. 2007); In re
Subpoena to Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 367 F. Supp. 2d at 945, 946 (M.D.N.C. 2005); Capitol
Records, Inc. v. Doe, Civ. No. 07-cv-1570-JM (POR), 2007 WL 2429830, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2007); Capitol Records, Inc. v. Does 1-16, Civ. No. 07-485 WJ/LFG, 2007 WL 1893603, at *2 (D.N.M.
May 24, 2007); LaFace Records, L.L.C. v. Does 1-5, No. 2:07-cv-187, 2007 WL 2867351, at *3 (W.D.
Mich. Sept. 27, 2007); see also Bruno, supra note 2 ("[Sleveral vindicated defendants began
countersuing the RIAA for wrongful prosecution, and respected educational institutions like the
state universities of Kansas, Maine and Wisconsin began refusing to cooperate."). Without the aid of
the legal system, there is no repercussion for wrongful prosecution, and state universities will not
have to cooperate, because they have their own ISP. See Bruno, supra.
122 See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1223 (D. Minn. 2008) (discussing
the rejection of the possibility of a legal claim for the "making available" of copyrighted works).
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Similar plans have been rejected in France, Germany, and New Zealand; and the
United Kingdom is predicted to reject the proposal as well.123 In France, the
"three-strikes" law was rejected on April 9, 2009, after eighteen months of
discussion. 2 4 Patrick Bloche, a deputy in the National Assembly, stated that the law
is "politically dead."'125 On July 20, 2009, Nicolas Sarkozy, French President,
"reintroduce [ed] an antipiracy law to the country's National Assembly."12 6 The new
1 27
proposal allows for "accelerated court convictions and $2,100 fines."'
New Zealand withdrew its law when ISPs could not agree with the music
business on the guidelines for defining abuse. 128 The United Kingdom is looking at
how other countries in the European Union react before they make a decision on the
"three strikes" law. 129 "On June 16, the British government published a Digital
Britain paper that suggests giving regulator Ofcom legal powers to impose an array
130
of technical restrictions on ISPs that are unable to reduce illegal filesharing."
Germany rejected the law because it was incompatible with German data and
telecommunications privacy legislation.1'1 Germany, however, does not shy away
from legal action. 132 While criminal prosecutions were the norm since 2004, the
German Public Prosecution Office ("PPO") now only advocates criminal proceedings
in cases where there have been over three thousand illegal downloads. 133 However,
there have been civil cases where infringers were fined for as few as two illegal
12 3

Aymeric Pichevin & Andre Paine, Of All The Gaul: French National Assembly Rejects
'Three Strikes'Legislation,BILLBOARD, Apr. 18, 2009, at 7.
The French rejection of the three-strikes legislation is the latest blow to
efforts by the recording industry to pass laws that would require Internet service
providers to cut off service to chronic copyright infringers.
In March, the New Zealand government withdrew its three-strikes law when
ISPs and the music business couldn't agree on a code of conduct. The government
has opened another round of talks on the proposed law.
The U.K. trade organization BPI has pushed for tougher regulation in its
submission to the British government's "Digital Britain" report, due in early
summer. Just a day before the French rejected the law, chief executive Geoff
Taylor predicted that the French three-strikes system would be "up and running
by autumn" and warned it was vital that "the U.K. is not to be left behind."
But British ministers have only hinted at imposing French-style measures

as a last resort.
And now, there's likely to be even less desire for emulating the French
proposal.
Id.
124

Id.

125 Id.
126 John Hopewell, EU Guns For Pirates: Countries Launch Array of Legal Measures,
VARIETY, June 29-July 12, 2009, at 14.
127 Id. (The new proposal is to replace the three strikes rule with a "speeding ticket-style fines
system.") (quoting Luc Besson).
128 Pichevin & Paine, supra note 123.

129 Id.

130

Hopewell, supra note 126.

131 Wolfgang

Spahr, GermanyRejects 'Three Strikes'PiracyPlan,BILLBOARD, Feb. 21, 2009, at

15.
132

See Wolfgang Spahr, The ProsecutionRests: German Biz Switches To Civil Piracy Cases,

BILLBOARD, Apr. 25, 2009, at 14 (describing Germany's actions and guidelines in suing illegal file

sharers).
133 Id.
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downloads. 134 Based on opposition to P2P activity, Spain has recently jailed a P2P
operator and fined him the dollar equivalent of $6,496.135 In Sweden, the creators of
a BitTorrent tracker, Pirate Bay, were sentenced to a year in jail and to pay
36
approximately $3.6 million to the film and music industries.
Instead of abandoning the court system and the case for direct infringement, the
RIAA should pursue a change to the statutory language and continue to sue for direct
and contributory infringement.

III.

SLIPPIN' INTO DARKNESS: THE CASE FOR CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT

One is liable for contributory infringement when one "knowingly contributes to
the infringing conduct of another."13 7 Contributory infringement requires: (1) direct
infringement by a third party; (2) actual or constructive knowledge that a third party
38
was directly infringing; and (3) a material contribution to the infringing activities. 1
For the courts to adopt a theory of contributory infringement for file-sharers,
they must first adopt the rationale behind the Hotaling case.13 9 In Hotaling, the
court held that a library distributed a published work pursuant to the Copyright Act
when it placed an unauthorized copy in its catalog/index system and made the copy
available to the public. 140 While the church in question had acquired a legitimate
copy of the microfiche in question, it also made microfiche copies of the works without
permission and sent the copies to several of its branch libraries.14 1 The owner of the
142
copyright contacted the church and demanded the church cease the distribution.
The Hotalings filed suit and the trial court granted a summary judgment motion in
favor of the church. 143 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit held that "[w]hen a public library adds a work to its collection, lists the work
in its index or catalog system, and makes the work available to the borrowing or
browsing public, it has completed all the steps necessary for distribution to the
144
public."

134
135

See id.
Howell Llewellyn, Spanish Court Jails P2P Operator,BILLBOARD, Apr. 25, 2009, at 15 ("A

Spanish Court has sentenced a man to six months in jail of operating an illegal file-sharing Web
site. No previous peer-to-peer lawsuits in Spain had resulted in convictions, due to the failure of
prosecutors to prove a profit motive.").
136 See Louise Nordstrom, INTERNET Hollywood Scores Win Over Pirate Bay Hub Swedish
Court Convicts Fourin File-sharingCase, Hous. CHRON., Apr. 18, 2009, at 4 ("The entertainment
industry won.., in a legal battle against file-sharing Pirate Bay, with guilty verdicts and one-year
prison sentences handed down to four men .... All four.., were ordered to pay damages of 30
million knonor ($3.6 million) .... ").
137 Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996).
138 In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 377 F. Supp. 2d 796, 801 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (citing A&M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013 n.2, 1019-22 (9th Cir. 2001).
139 See Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 118 F.3d 199, 203 (4th Cir.
1997).

Id. at 201.
Id.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 202.
144 Id. at 203.
140

141
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As indicated earlier, a copyright infringement is a violation of "any of the
exclusive rights of the copyright owner."'145 "One of [these] exclusive rights is the
right 'to distribute copies ... of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other
transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending."' 146 The first-sale doctrine
applies when an "owner of a lawful copy of the work ...sell[s], rent[s], lend[s], or
otherwise dispos[es] of the lawful copy" without retaining a copy of the work. 147 In
this instance, because the legal copy is physically transferred, the copyright owner's
right to distribution is not infringed. 148 Distributing unauthorized copies, however,
violates the copyright owner's distribution right and does create infringement. 149 To
create a case for "distribution" one must show the copy was "disseminated to the
50
public."1
In Hotaling,"[t]he librar[y] did not record public use of the microfiche" copies. 151
The church argued that because records of public use were not available, the court
could only find that the work in the library collection was merely an "offer to
distribute" and not a "distribution."'152 The court found that under the church's
definition, "a copyright holder would be prejudiced by a library that does not keep
records of public use, and the library would unjustly profit by its omission."'153 The
court also stated:
Moreover, even if we were to accept the Church's argument, it would
not change the outcome. If, as the Church says, actual use by the public
must be shown to establish distribution, no one can expect a copyright
holder to prove particular instances of use by the public when the proof is
impossible to produce because the infringing library has not kept records of
public use. To reiterate, a copyright holder should not be prejudiced in this
manner, nor should an infringer benefit from its failure to keep records. In
this case, the Church's library did not record instances of public use of the
Hotaling microfiche. 154
This line of reasoning applies to P2P servers because every individual user is
responsible for creating his or her own personal music library. Unlike the library
system where records of dissemination are normally collected, the P2P systems are
designed so that there are no records of downloads of stored files. 155 It would
severely prejudice the copyright holders to require them to prove that actual copies
were disseminated. 15 6 In Hotaling, the library retained a copy of the copyrighted

17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2006).
Hotalng,118 F.3d at 203 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 106(3)).
147 Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 109(a)).
145
146

148 See

id.

149

Id.

150

Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 106(3)).

151 Id.
152

Id.

153Id.
154 Id.

at 204.
See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011-13 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing
the general framework of P2P networks and that the network itself keeps no records).
156 See Hotaing,118 F.3d at 204.
155
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work in its "collection." 15 7 On a P2P server, the collector who uploads the music to
create a collection must maintain a copy of the work in his or her collection or the
158
work will cease to be available from that user.
A court has already adopted this logic. 15 9 In the United States District Court of
the Northern District of California, Napster escaped direct infringement liability
because:
[P]laintiffs seize upon the cataloging or indexing system in Hotaling and
argue that Napster's "indexing" system is akin to that in Hotaing. There
is, however, more to Hotalingthan that. In that case the library had a copy
of the copyrighted work in its "collection". Napster did not have works in its
"collection"; it did not have a "collection" of recordings. The infringing
works never resided on the Napster system. Instead, plaintiffs here seek to
establish copyright infringement based on the mere fact that the names of
their copyrighted musical compositions and sound recordings appeared in
Napster's index of available files. This might constitute evidence that the
listed works were available to Napster users, but it is certainly not
conclusive proof that the songs identified in the index were actually
uploaded onto the network in a manner that would be equivalent to the way
in which the genealogical materials at issue in Hota'ng were copies and
160
distributed to the church's branch libraries.
Additionally, contributory infringement is found when a contributory infringer:
(1) has direct or constructive knowledge of a third party's infringing activity; and (2)
induces, causes, or materially contributes to the infringing conduct. 161 For the
Internet, the United States Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals
162
for the Ninth Circuit have recognized the concept of "inducement."
If the logic from Hotalingis adopted, the question becomes one of showing if the
individual who posted the copyrighted file either, induced, 163 enabled, 64 or
contributed 165 to the infringing conduct.

157 Id. at 202.
158 See Napster,239 F.3d at 1011-13 (describing generally how a P2P server works).

159See In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 377 F. Supp. 2d 796, 805 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
160Id. at 803.
161Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n, 494 F.3d 788, 795 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Ellison v.

Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted)); see also Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry
Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996) (discussing the elements of contributory
infringement).
162 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005) ("One
infringes contributorily by intentionally inducing or encouraging direct infringement"); Perfect 10,

487 F.3d at 727 ("[A]n actor may be contributorily liable [under GroksteA] for intentionally
encouraging direct infringement if the actor knowingly takes steps that are substantially certain to

result in such direct infringement"); Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019 (stating that the defendant incurs
contributory liability when they "engage[] in 'personal conduct that encourages or assists the
infringement' (quoting Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Pubrg Co., 158 F.3d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1998)).
163See Grokster,545 U.S. at 930.
164See Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 263.
165See Napster,239 F.3d at 1020.
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A. Inducement. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913
(2005)
In Grokster, the United States Supreme Court applied a patent law theory of
"inducement" to the claim of contributory infringement. 16 6 Specifically, the Court
stated, "[O]ne who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe
copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster
infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties." 16 7 The
Court indicated the standard for inducement liability is providing or creating a
service with the object of "promoting its use to infringe copyright."168
"The
inducement rule .... premises liability on purposeful, culpable expression and
conduct, and thus does nothing to compromise legitimate commerce or discourage
innovation having a lawful promise." 169 Additionally, in Grokster,the software was
developed as a P2P software, and was engineered, disseminated, and promoted
70
explicitly for facilitating piracy.
While Grokster was found liable for contributory infringement for marketing the
software that was designed for piracy and illegal downloading, it only worked as a
massive infrastructure for individual infringers to infringe. 171 If Grokster is
expanded to state that anyone who uses the P2P software created to market
infringement to infringe by creating a shared folder that allows for anyone on the
infrastructure to illegally download and pirate music, the inducement rule may stand
for the individual. If the creation of the shared file is seen as the act of inducement,
Grokster may be expanded to extend contributory infringement for anyone who
allows others to download their "shared music" and would comply with initial
standard of contributory liability: "[o]ne infringes contributorily by intentionally
' 172
inducing or encouraging direct infringement."

B. Enabling: Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996)
In Fonovisa,Inc. v.CherryAuction, Inc.,173 individual operators of a flea market
named Cherry Auction were found liable for contributory copyright infringement
when they provided the space for infringing vendors to sell their goods. 174 The court
found that primary infringers, the vendors who sold illegal copies of copyrighted
goods, and the flea-market were engaged in a mutual enterprise of infringement and
stated "[I]t would be difficult for the infringing activity to take place in the massive
166Grokster,545 U.S. at 936-37.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 914.

169Id. at 937.
170 Id. at 923-24 ("[F]rom the moment Grokster and StreamCast began to distribute their free
software, each one clearly voiced the objective that recipients use it to download copyrighted works,
and each took active steps to encourage infringement.").
171Id. at 919-20.
172Id. at 930 (citing Gershwin Pubrg Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159,
1162 (2d Cir. 1971)).
17376 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
174Id. at 264.
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quantities alleged without the support services provided."' 175 These support services
included the renting of space, specifically because the owners "retain[ed] the right to
176
exclude any vendor for any reason, at any time, and thus [could] exclude vendors."
Additionally the County Sherriff had raided the flea-market two years before the
complaint was filed and seized 38,000 counterfeit recordings. 177 This completed the
prerequisite knowledge and the act of enabling that allowed for a finding of
contributory infringement. 178
While the flea-market in Fonovisa was a geographical location where vendors
met to swap infringing materials and goods, a shared folder is a digital space where
individuals create a library of potentially infringing material and goods. 179 Because
of the way the P2P server operates, those who create these types of shared folders are
80
Just
aware of the ability of others to make copies and further distribute the work.
like the flea-market owners created the space for the vendors to engage in direct
infringement, those who create a shared folder on a P2P network create a space for
other individuals to engage in direct infringement. 181 Under the logic of Fonovisa
this digital space with the prerequisite constructive knowledge should be enough for
8 2
the finding of contributory infringement.

C. Contributory.A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001)
In A&MRecords, Inc. v. Napster,Inc.,18 3 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit found that the designer and distributor of a software program was
liable for contributory infringement. 8 4 Napster was a file-sharing program which
was expressly engineered to enable the easy exchange of pirated music. 18 5 Citing
Fonovisa, the court found that "Napster materially contributes to the infringing
activity . . . , 'without the support services defendant provides, Napster users could
not find and download the music they want with the ease of which defendant
186
boasts."'
Drawing on the similarities between Fonovisa and Napster, individuals
materially contribute to the infringement by offering services that allow
unauthorized copies to be made of copyrighted music by offering the space and
services that allow it to happen on a larger scale than would be possible if they had
175 Id.
176

Id. at 261.

177 Id.
178 See
179 See

id. at 262-64.
id.at 261.
180See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919-20 (2005).
181See Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 262-64 (holding that a party with knowledge, and who benefits
from the infringing activity, can be held contributorily liable).
182 See id. at 264.
183 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
184 Id. at 1020.
185 Id. at 1020 n.5 ("[A] document authored by Napster co-founder Sean Parker mentioned 'the
need to remain ignorant of users' real names and IP addresses since they are exchanging pirated
music (quoting A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 918 (N.D. Cal. 2000), affd
in partand rev'din part,239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001)).
186 Id. at 1022 (quoting Napster,114 F. Supp. 2d at 920) (citation omitted).
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not created the digital space (i.e. the shared folder).187 Both the owners of the
flea-market in Fonovisa and the creator of the software in Napster increased the
frequency of infringement by making it easy, just as one who creates a digital library
and allows others access to those library files increased the frequency of infringement
18 8
by making it easy and available.

IV.

THE ANSWER TO THE QUESTION: MODIFICATION TO SECTION 101

18 9
Congress should add a definition to section 101 for "distribution" for clarity.
Immediately following the definition for "display," the following language should be
added to the Copyright Act:
'Distribution' includes any act of dissemination,
including any offer for dissemination, of a work to the public by means of sale, rental,
lease or lending, uploading to a file-share network, or transmitting the work in any
media or by any method, whether now know or later discovered or developed. The
act of dissemination and/or the offer to disseminate a work or copies of the work to
any persons or file-sharing network for purposes of further distribution, performance,
or display, constitutes distribution. Distribution does not require actual receipt or
downloading of the work by any third party."

CONCLUSION

In addition to Congress amending the Act, the courts need to act like United
States Supreme Court decisions mean something and follow the precedent created by
the Court in Grokster.190 The RIAA should continue to pursue illegal uploaders and
downloaders in court to ensure that no one is falsely accused of copyright
infringement.
While the RIAA suits have not dramatically curtailed illegal
downloading, more stories about the large damages accessed Jammie Thomas will
begin to deter illegal downloading. According to Mitch Bainwol, the chairman/CEO
of the RIAA, "Our 2008 [song] shipment numbers show that revenue from an everexpanding array of digital formats grew 44% in the last two years, from $1.9 billion
to $2.7 billion, and now makes up more than 30% of music sales." 191 Bainwol further
stated, "During the last 10 years, a series of court decisions in the United States and
abroad have confirmed that basic property rights in the physical world apply in the
online world too. The most recent example is the conviction of the Pirate Bay
operators in Sweden. ' 192 In addition, the availability of legal downloads will also

187See Napster,239 F.3d at 1022; Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264.
188 See Napster,239 F.3d at 1022; Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264.
189 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
190See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919 (2005) (holding
those who induce, promote, or contribute to copyright infringement as liable, particularly in an
online context such as P2P networks).
191Mitch Bainwol, Courting Success: Ten Years After Napster, The Pirate Bay Case Proves
That LegalRemedies Work, BILLBOARD, June 6, 2009 at 10.
192 Id.
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help to prevent illegal downloading. 193 In the words of Marty Lafferty, CEO of the
Distributed Computing Industry Association, which represents P2P companies,
"Experience has demonstrated that efforts at enforcement against copyright
infringement alone, which do not also provide attractive commercial alternatives, will
94
be outpaced by technological advancement and are therefore doomed to failure."1

193 See id. ("More Internet-connected households today download music legally than illegally23% compared with 18% in 2008, according to new data from NPD.").
194 Andre Paine, Avast Ye Hackers: The Pirate Bay Trial Marks A Key Battle In Anti-P2P
Campaign, BILLBOARD, Feb. 28, 2009, at 9.

